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Abstract 
The performance of children in a serial reaction time task was studied. The independent 
variables were age (third and sixth graders), stimulus sequence (3 levels of structural 
complexity), stimulus type (asterisks and letters), and stimulus type sequence (letter-
asterisk and asterisk-letter). Explicit knowledge was assessed using verbal reports, 
recognition memory, and a generation task. Children's serial reaction times decreased as 
a function of verbal awareness and structure, but not as a function of age. Children's 
implicit sequence knowledge did not appear to transfer across different perceptual stimuli 
associated with the same response locations. There was some indication that participants 
learned complex four-trial part sequences implicitly. Participants presented with the 
high, as compared to the moderate, structure sequence were more likely to explicitly learn 
segments of the sequences, particularly series and bigrams/dyads. Measures of explicit 
learning appear to be related to a common explicit knowledge base. These findings are 
interpreted as reflecting implicit and explicit learning occur in parallel and that age 
invariance and transfer specificity of implicit knowledge may characterize middle 
childhood. 
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Introduction 
In the serial reaction time (SR T) task introduced by Nissen and Bullemer ( 1987), 
an asterisk appears on successive trials in one of four horizontal positions. Participants 
are required to press one of four buttons located below the asterisk as quickly and 
accurately as possible. The asterisk is displayed until the correct button is pressed. 
Following a correct button press, the asterisk is extinguished and a new asterisk appears 
in another position. Some participants experience asterisks that appear in a particular 
repeating order of positions while others experience asterisks that are presented in a 
quasi-random order such that asterisks appear unpredictably, but in a different position, 
on successive trails. Nissen and Bullemer reported participants who experienced a 
repeating sequence of asterisks decreased their reaction times (RTs) across trial blocks 
faster than participants who experienced a quasi-random sequence. This decrease in RT 
was considered an indirect measure of learning the repeating sequence. A number of 
researchers have claimed that most participants learn but do not become aware of the 
repeating sequence (Cherry & Stadler, 1995; Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Curran, 1997; 
Frensch & Miner, 1994; Hartman, Knopman, & Nissen, 1989; Knopman & Nissen, 1991 ; 
Mayr, 1996; Meulemans, Vander Linden, & Perruchet, 1998; Nissen, Willingham, & 
Hartman, 1989; Stadler, 1992; Stadler & Neely, 1997; Willingham & Dumas, 1997; 
Willingham, Greeley, & Bardon, 1993; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). 
Although the researchers cited above contend learning can occur without 
awareness, some maintain that both implicit and explicit learning occur in parallel 
(Curran and Keele, 1993; Noseworthy, 1996; Seger, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Willingham, 
2001; Willingham & Goedert-Eschmann, 1999; Willingham, Salidis, & Gabrieli, 2002), 
and others argue all learning is likely explicit (Shanks & St. John, 1994; Shanks and 
Johnstone, 1999). In the current experiment, changes were made to the original Nissen 
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and Bullemer (1987) SRT paradigm to examine a number of issues related to learning and 
awareness in a SRT task. First, although researchers have questioned the adequacy of 
verbal reports, recognition, and generation tasks to diagnose explicit knowledge (Jackson 
and Jackson, 1995; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999; Stadler and 
Roediger, 1998; Perruchet & Amorin, 1992), little is known about whether measures 
derived from these tasks reflect a common explicit knowledge base in the SRT task. In 
order to partially fill this void, children were presented with all three tasks so that verbal 
awareness, recognition memory, and generation measures could be intercorrelated. 
Second, although explicit learning is age dependent (Siegler, 1998), Reber (1992, 1993) 
maintains that implicit learning is age invariant, a hypothesis that is not consistently 
supported in the literature. In order to further investigate age effects on sequence learning 
in a SR T task, third and sixth graders were used as participants. Third, Berry and Dienes 
(1993) and Dienes and Berry (1997) maintain that knowledge acquired through implicit 
learning, versus explicit learning, tends not to transfer to related tasks, (i.e., transfer 
specific). The transposition results obtained with children in our laboratory are consistent 
with the transfer specificity hypothesis (Rabinowitz and Howe, 1994; Rabinowitz and 
Herder, 2000). However, Willingham (1999) found that implicit knowledge acquired by 
adults does transfer when different perceptual stimuli and sequences are experienced in a 
SR T task when participants experience the same response location sequence. In order to 
further explore transfer specificity, bi-directional transfer was examined with children. 
Lastly, decreased task complexity, as defined by more redundant information in a 
sequence, has been associated with faster learning in a SR T task with adult populations 
(Stadler, 1992, 1993; Stadler & Neely, 1997) and increased verbal awareness in a 
covariation task using school age children (Noseworthy, 1996). Furthermore, increased 
task complexity has been associated with the failure of 6 -to 8 -year-olds and 9 - to 11 -
year-olds to implicitly learn a repeating sequence when they responded in the standard 
mode, i.e., bimanually, in a SRT task (De Guise & Lassonde, 2001). In order to assess 
the effects of sequence structure on sequence learning and awareness in school age 
children, participants experienced one of three types of sequential structures varying in 
redundancy. 
Learning without awareness in an SRT task 
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Although a number of researchers claim learning can occur without awareness, 
others have questioned the adequacy ofthe measures used to assess awareness (Jackson 
and Jackson, 1995; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999; Stadler and 
Roediger, 1998; Perruchet & Amorin, 1992). Willingham, Nissen, and Bullemer 
(Experiment 1, 1989) used the Nissen and Bullemer SRT paradigm to examine learning 
and awareness using a university population, and assessed awareness using two measures: 
verbal reports and a generation task. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
experimental or control group. The experimental group experienced a 1 0-trial repeating 
sequence over four 1 00-trial blocks. A series of questions to assess their verbal 
awareness of the sequential structure followed. Participants who reported not noticing 
any type of sequential structure and/or were unable to state three consecutive stimulus 
positions were classified as having no explicit knowledge; those who reported noticing 
the sequence and could state four to nine consecutive positions were classified as having 
some explicit knowledge; and participants who stated they noticed the sequence and 
could report all positions were said to have full explicit knowledge. Subsequently, 
participants in the experimental group and in an untrained control group completed two 
1 0-trial blocks in a generation task. On each trial, they were required to predict where the 
next stimulus would appear by pushing the button under the expected location. Feedback 
was provided on each trial by illuminating the predicted stimulus only after the correct 
button was pressed. 
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In the SRT task, each participant's median reaction times (RTs) on successive 10-
trial blocks were calculated then averaged across a 1 00-trial block. The difference 
between average median RTs on the first and last 100-trial block was used as a measure 
of learning. In the generation task, the accuracy on the first 1 0-trial block was used as a 
measure of participants' knowledge ofthe 10-trial repeating sequence experienced in the 
SRT task, and the second 1 0-trial block as a measure of explicit learning. Willingham et 
al. (1989) reported each of the three awareness groups who experienced a repeating 
sequence learned more than the quasi-random control group from the original Nissen and 
Bullemer (1987) study. On the generation task, the accuracy ofthe no explicit 
knowledge group was similar to the accuracy of the Willingham et al. (1989) untrained 
control group and was significantly below the accuracy of the full explicit knowledge 
group on the first 1 0-trial block. The generation accuracies of the no explicit knowledge 
and the some knowledge groups were not significantly different. The authors suggested 
the generation data provided additional evidence that the no explicit knowledge group 
had learned the repeating sequence implicitly. Willingham et al. (1989) concluded two 
dissociable memory systems exist and that learning occurs in the absence of explicit 
knowledge. 
In contrast, Perruchet and Amorin (1992) suggested that all RT improvements in 
the SRT task were a result of explicit knowledge and, therefore, could be explained by 
one memory system. They argued the generation task used by Willingham et al. (1989) 
did not provide an adequate assessment of awareness because participants were not told 
what sequence to generate and were provided with feedback which might have disrupted 
performance. Perruchet and Amorin (1992 Experiment 1) presented two 100-trial blocks 
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of the same repeating 1 0-trial sequence used by Willingham et al. ( 1989) to an 
experimental group while a control group experienced a quasi-random sequence. 
Subsequently, participants were instructed to generate the previously practiced sequence 
without receiving feedback after each response. The analysis of the RTs in the SRT task 
revealed the experimental group had faster RTs than the control group by the second 
block of trials. A fine grain analysis ofRT performance in the SRT task and accuracy in 
the generation task demonstrated that faster RTs on some stimulus positions were 
associated with better generation performance on some three and four trial runs ending in 
these positions. Consequently, the authors concluded explicit knowledge was responsible 
for the learning. 
Willingham, Greeley, and Bardone (1993) attempted to rebut Perruchet and 
Amorin's conclusion. In their SRT task, an experimental group responded to a 16-trial 
repeating sequence and a control group responded to quasi-randomly displayed stimuli. 
Participants' verbal awareness of the repeating sequence was assessed using a series of 
interview questions. The authors found the experimental group's RT performance was 
faster on the verbally reported segments as compared to unreported segments, but R Ts on 
unreported segments were still faster than those of the control group. In an attempt to 
minimize the possibility that participants acquired explicit knowledge of the repeating 
sequence, conservative criteria were used to categorize participants into a no explicit 
knowledge group. The two participants meeting these criteria apparently learned 
implicitly. 
Meulemans et al. (1998) also claimed that SRT learning could occur without 
explicit knowledge based on measures of recognition memory. A group of university 
undergraduate students and two groups of children aged 6 to 7 and 1 0 to 11 experienced 
five 84-trial blocks of intermixed random/repeating sequences. Each block started with 
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four random trials which were followed by five 16-trial sets. Each set consisted of a 
repeating 1 0-stimulus sequence followed by six random stimuli. Following the SRT task, 
participants were told that the stimuli they experienced contained a repeating sequence. 
They were then given a recognition memory test in order to assess explicit knowledge of 
the repeating sequence. This task involved responding to 4-stimulus part sequences, in 
the same manner as in the SRT task, and judging whether the part sequence was 
contained in the repeating sequence. Half of the part sequences were old. The new part 
sequences were based on the old sequences with the exception that the last trial was 
quasi-randomly determined such that it was not a repetition of the third trial and created a 
new sequence that was not present in the original 1 0-stimulus sequence. 
Learning in the Meulemans et al. (1998) study was assessed by calculating the 
difference in participants' median RTs on repeating vs. random stimuli. All participants 
responded faster to the repeating stimuli. The recognition ratings on the old vs new 
sequences did not differ significantly. The authors concluded all participants learned the 
sequence implicitly and claimed "... the analysis in the recognition task showed 
performance levels which suggest that participants did not acquire any explicit 
knowledge ofthe repeating sequence." However, Meulemans et al.'s (1998) recognition 
memory test may not have been sensitive enough to detect relevant traces of explicit 
knowledge acquired during training (Shanks & St. John, 1994; Shanks and Johnstone, 
1997) because the only cues differentiating the old and new part sequences appeared in 
the fourth elements. In contrast, if some new part sequences contained salient elements 
making them obvious sequences, i.e., ringers, then this recognition assessment may 
reveal participants do acquire some explicit knowledge about the sequence structure even 
though they might learn the complex sequences implicitly. 
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Perruchet and Amorin (Experiment 2, 1992) also reported non-significant 
recognition rating differences between old and new 4-trial sequences. Participants 
experienced one block of six successive 1 0-trial sequences. Subsequently half the 
participants completed a free-generation task, described earlier in Perruchet and Amorin 
(1992, Experiment 1 ), and the others, a recognition task. The latter consisted of rating 1 0 
different four-trial sequences based on the repeating sequence and 1 0 different four-trial 
sequences that were randomly generated with the constraint that successive trials were 
not repeated. Participants were instructed to respond in the same manner as in the SR T 
task and after each four-trial sequence rate their recognition on a four point scale. A 
control group experienced random sequences in the SRT task and subsequently 
performed the free-generation task. The authors reported participants in the repeating 
sequence group did not rate the old sequences significantly different from the new 
sequences, although this difference approached significance. However, participants in the 
repeating sequence group who experienced the generation task generated some part 
sequences more often than the control group. 
In Experiment 3, Perruchet and Amorin (1992) used a dual task three choice SRT 
paradigm and reported a significant difference between participants' recognition scores 
on old and new part sequences. In the SRT task, participants responded as per 
Experiment 2 except the asterisk stimulus appeared in one of three locations above three 
response buttons during four 1 00-trial blocks. In addition, after each stimulus was 
displayed a low or high pitch tone was presented and participants were instructed to 
report the number of high pitch tones that occurred after each block of trials. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three groups. In the two experimental groups, two 
participants from each group experienced one of the following 5-trial repeating sequences 
over the four 100-trial blocks: A-B-C-B-C, A-C-B-C-B, B-A-C-A-C, B-C-A-C-A, C-A-
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B-A-B, C-B-A-B-A. Note that these 5-trial sequences appear to be low in complexity in 
comparison to those commonly used in 4-choice tasks as they consist of a unique element 
followed by a double alternation of the two remaining elements. Participants in the 
control group experienced a quasi-random sequence of stimuli. Subsequent to the SRT 
task, participants in one experimental group and the control group completed a free-
generation task. Participants in the other experimental group were given a recognition 
task similar to that described in Experiment 2 with the exception that half the old and new 
sequences were five- rather than four-trial sequences. 
Across trial blocks, the SRTs were similar for all groups. Irrespective of this lack 
of evidence for learning, the authors suggested RTs on some serial positions in the 
structured sequences may have been longer than the RTs on the same serial positions in 
the random sequences and "... hence partially compensating for the improvement in 
performance observed on the other serial positions. An analysis ofRT as a function of 
the serial positions was performed on the last block of trials." (p. 794). The RTs were 
significantly different and the authors concluded participants who experienced a repeating 
sequence acquired knowledge of the sequence. Also, these participants differentiated old 
and new sequences in the recognition task and produced partial segments of the repeating 
sequence in the generation task. Because the training sequences were low in complexity, 
it is not surprising that participants differentiated the quasi-randomly generated new part 
sequences in Experiment 3, but failed to do so in Experiment 2. 
Using verbal reports, generation, and recognition tasks researchers have reported 
inconsistent conclusions regarding whether learning is explicit. However, it is likely 
some measures, the recognition measures in particular, lack sensitivity to aspects of the 
explicit knowledge of the sequential structure participants' acquire in the SRT task. 
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Age lnyariance in Implicit Learning 
Reber (1992, 1993) hypothesized that hard-wired modular structures that operate 
independently of consciously controlled processes predate the evolutionary development 
of conscious awareness and that conscious awareness is built on these older structures. 
Based on these hypotheses, Reber (1992, 1993) claimed implicit learning is age invariant 
in contrast to explicit learning which is age dependent (Siegler, 1998). Since the early 
1990s an increasing number of implicit learning studies have been conducted with 
children and, in particular, with infants (for an extensive review see Rovee-Collier, 
Hayne, & Columbo, 2000) and children with impairments (De Guise, Jambaque, Dulac, 
& Lassonde, 1999; Fletcher, Maybery, & Bennett, 2000; Inui & Suzuki, 1998; LaForce, 
Hayward, & Cox, 2001). However, these populations are likely not the most ideal 
populations to investigate Reber's theory of age in variance. During infancy there are 
major organic structural changes that occur in the brain (Johnson, 1997). Also, learning 
deficits associated with brain impairments and developmental delays may also reflect 
structural changes in the brain which may be unrepresentative of normal development. 
In the normal population, age in variance of implicit learning has been reported by 
the majority of researchers (Howard & Howard, 1989; 1992; Litke, 2001; Meulemans et 
al. 1998; Noseworthy, 1996; Rabinowitz & Howe, 1994; Roter, 1989, as reported in 
Reber, 1993; Vinter & Perruchet, 2000; 2002). However, some researchers have found 
implicit learning is age dependent (Cherry & Stadler, 1995; Curran, 1997; Howard & 
Howard, 1997; 2001; Maybery, Taylor, & O'Brien-Malone, 1995 Reber, 1967) and 
others have found implicit learning is age dependent in particular age ranges with 
children (De Guise and Lassonde, 2001; Thomas and Nelson, 2001). 
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Developmental studies with adults. Howard and Howard (1997; 2001) and Curan 
(1997) used embedded random stimuli in a repeating sequence and reported age related 
effects in a SRT task with adults. Participants in Howard and Howard (1997) responded 
to a repeating sequence and random trials which alternated: 1 r 4 r 3 r 2 r; r represents a 
randomly generated stimulus and the numbers 1-4 represent the positions, from left to 
right, of the stimuli that repeat across the 8-trial blocks. There were no constraints on the 
random generation of stimuli and therefore a stimulus may have appeared consecutively 
in the same location. Two groups of participants, aged 20 and 70 years old, experienced 
twenty-one 90-trial blocks. Each block started with 10 random trials which were 
followed by 80 trials containing the alternating repeating/random sequence. At the end of 
the last block, participants completed a written questionnaire in which they were asked to 
identify any strategies they employed while performing the task. The participants then 
repeated the experiment five more times on different days. At the end of the sixth day, 
participants were interviewed and asked a series of questions about the regularity of the 
repeating stimuli. 
Howard and Howard (1997) found that participants did not acquire any explicit 
knowledge of the sequence and the younger participants learned more than the older 
group. In contrast to their previous age invariance results (Howard and Howard, 1989, 
1992), they speculated the embedded random stimuli eliminated simple stimulus pairs 
(e.g. , AB, CD, DA, etc.), disrupted organizational processes during learning, and placed 
greater demands on short term memory. Any or all of these changes might have 
differentially impaired the learning of older, as compared to younger, adults. 
Cherry and Stadler (1995) found differences in implicit learning when comparing 
adults of differing ability using a SRT task. A group of university students and two 
groups of seniors, sampled from different populations, comprised three groups: old-low 
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(low-ability older-adults with a mean age of 67.0 years); old-high (high-ability older-
adults with a mean age of67.9 years), and university students with a mean age of22.0 
years. The participants experienced an initial 1 00-trial block of quasi-randomly ordered 
stimuli and then experienced a total of eight 100 trial blocks that contained a 1 0-trial 
repeating sequence. At the end of the last block, participants were questioned about the 
repeating sequence and then were required to complete a generation task. The authors 
found all groups learned the repeating sequence in the SRT task with little verbal 
awareness and claimed all participants learned implicitly. They reported no significant 
difference in implicit learning between the young and old-high group of participants, but 
found a significant difference in implicit learning between these groups and the old-low 
group. The authors concluded ability factors affected implicit learning in older adults. 
On the generation task, the young and old-high groups showed similar continuous 
improvements in performance. The old-low group of participants showed an initial 
improvement during the first two cycles of the repeating sequence, but showed little 
evidence of further learning in subsequent trials. 
Reber (1967) used letter strings, that were created according to a formal system of 
rules referred to as an artificial grammar, to study implicit learning. Participants first 
memorized letter strings based on the artificial grammar. Immediately following 
learning, they were informed about the grammar rules, shown new letter strings which 
represented both grammatical and ungrammatical strings, and were then asked to judge 
the grammaticality of each string. Reber (1967) reported undergraduates made more 
correct responses on the test trials than did high-school seniors and questioning revealed 
all participants knew little about the grammar (learned implicitly). 
Studies with children. Maybery et al. (1995) reported age influenced both 
implicit and explicit learning in young children using a covariation learning paradigm. 
12 
They varied age (5-7 and 10-12 year-olds) and IQ (low, medium, and high) in an implicit 
learning and an explicit learning task. The tasks were administered on separate days and 
the presentation order of the tasks was counterbalanced within each of the six groups 
determined by age and IQ. In the learning phase of the implicit task, the experimenter 
told the child that when he brought out a covered ( 4 x 4 matrix) board containing 
pictures of different objects (e.g., chair, house, shoe) to point to the picture of the house 
when the cover was removed. The quadrant that contained the house was determined by 
the color of the matrix apparatus and whether the experimenter approached the child from 
the left or right side when he brought out a matrix board. During the test phase, a similar 
process was followed except the pictures remained covered and the child was asked to 
guess where the house could be found. After the test phase, the child's verbal awareness 
of the covariation rule was assessed by asking a series of questions. Each question was 
more specific than the previous question. On the alternate day an explicit learning task 
was given. This involved the child discovering the covariation rules determined by a 3 x 
3 matrix with the experimenter identifying the salient cue dimensions for the rule 
discovery. 
As expected, the results from the explicit learning task revealed the older children 
aged 10- 12 years old and the children with higher IQs outperformed the younger 
children aged 5 - 7 years old and lower IQ children. In the implicit learning task, none of 
the children reported the covariation rule. However, the older children correctly guessed 
the quadrants determined by the side of approach, but not the color of the apparatus, cue 
more often than did the younger children. Also, in contrast to the explicit task, 
performance was not related to IQ. Mayberry et al. claimed all the children learned this 
task implicitly and performance was affected by age. 
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Thomas and Nelson (2001) examined sequence learning in a SRT task using 4-, 7-
, and 10-years-old. In Experiment 1, the 7- and 10-year-olds responded to spatial stimuli 
that were bitmap images of a golden retriever. The children were" ... instructed to 'catch' 
the dog as quickly as possible by pressing the button that corresponded to the dog's 
spatial location." (p. 369). They were allowed to use any finger combination in 
responding. The authors reported most of the 7 -year-olds used their index finger from 
each hand while the 1 0-year-olds tended to use two fingers from each hand. The children 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a no-exposure condition or a 
preexposure condition. In the preexposure condition, children were told about the 
repeating sequence and observed three cycles of the sequence. In the no-exposure 
condition, children were not informed about the repeating sequence. The children 
experienced 1 00-trial blocks. On Blocks 1 and 4 a quasi-random sequence was displayed 
while a repeating sequence was used on blocks 2, 3, and 5. After training children's 
awareness of the sequence was assessed through verbal reports and a generation task. 
"To control for baseline reaction-time differences between groups, a sequence-specific 
learning effect was calculated using a proportional measure of magnitude comparing the 
difference between random and sequence trials to overall RT for each subject (i.e., 
[Block4 -Block 5] I [Block 4 +Block 5]" (p. 372). There was no significant difference in 
learning between the two age groups. Preexposure, as compared to no-exposure, was 
associated with rate of learning and explicit knowledge. 
In their second experiment (Thomas & Nelson, 2001), 4-year-olds were used as 
participants and most of the children demonstrated implicit learning of the repeating 
sequence. There was no effect of preexposure and few participants acquired any explicit 
knowledge of the sequence structure. Using the proportional measure, the authors found 
that the 7- and 10-year-olds in Experiment I learned more than did the 4-year-olds in 
Experiment 2. 
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De Guise and Lassonde (200 1) examined sequence learning using four groups of 
children: 6- to 8-year-olds, 9- to 11-year-olds, 12- to 14-year-olds, and 15- to 16-years. 
The authors hypothesized that the corpus callosum, "which ensures the exchange of 
information between the two cerebral hemispheres" (p. 253), and is relatively immature in 
children younger than 12 years of age, influences sequence learning in a SRT task. In 
order to investigate this hypothesis, children's RT performance in bimanual and 
unimanual responding conditions were compared. Unfortunately, the authors confounded 
sequence structure with these conditions. They found 6- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 11-
year-olds, but not the 12- to 14 year-olds and 15- to 16 -year-olds, failed to implicitly 
learn the sequence in the bimanual condition. In contrast, all children in the unimanual 
condition learned the sequence at a similar rate. The authors concluded that the most 
likely explanation for this interaction between age and uni-/bimanual responding was the 
maturation of the corpus callosum. However, since children in this age range implicitly 
learn less complex sequences bimanually (Meulemans et al.,l998; Thomas & Nelson, 
200 I), normal adults implicitly learn sequences of equal or greater complexity 
(Willingham et al. , 1989), and structure has been shown to influence implicit learning in 
adults (Stadler, 1992; Stadler & Neely, 1997), it is possible that the complexity of the 
sequence, rather than the manuality of responding, accounts for the failure to learn. 
In summary, although the majority of researchers have found that implicit 
learning is age invariant, there is enough empirical evidence to question Reber' s 
hypothesis that implicit learning is age invariant. Older adults and adults with low 
abilities learn at a slower rate than that of young adults (Cherry and Stadler,1995, Curan, 
1997; Howard and Howard, 1997), and 6- to 8-olds and 9- to 11-year-olds fail to 
implicitly learn complex sequences (De Guise and Lassonde, 2001). It appears that, at 
least in some situations, age is correlated with the rate of implicit learning. 
Transfer Specificity of Implicitly Acquired Knowledge 
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While a number of authors contend that knowledge acquired through implicit 
learning is transfer specific (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Dienes & Berry, 1997; Cohen, 
Poldrack, and Eichenbaum, 1997), inconsistent empirical findings have been reported 
(Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Rabinowitz & Herder, 
2000; Rabinowitz and Howe, 1994; Reber, 1969; Tunney & Altmann, 1999; Willingham 
et al.,1989; Willingham, 1997; Willingham, 1998a; 1998b; Willingham 2002). 
Transposition studies. Rabinowitz and Howe (1994) found that implicit 
knowledge of the middle concept does not transfer to a novel dimension and 
consequently could be considered transfer specific. In Experiment 2, children in Grades 
2, 3, 4, and 5 were presented sets of three stimuli (e.g., dowels varying in height) and 
learned with feedback to pick the middle stimulus (e.g., the middle-height dowel). They 
were told that one of the stimuli was always correct, and the experimenter would say 
correct if they pointed to the correct stimulus, and the experimenter would say wrong if 
they pointed to an incorrect stimulus. After each child reached the training criterion of 9 
correct responses in 10 successive trials, a series of transfer trials involving novel 
dimensions were presented. The children were told that if they thought about what they 
had learned, they would be able to point to the correct stimulus. No feedback was 
provided. After the transfer test was completed, the children were asked how they solved 
the problem. If they answered with middle or second, they were considered to be 
verbally aware. Rabinowitz and Howe (1994) found that implicit, unlike explicit, 
learners failed to transfer the middle concept and took more trials to reach training 
criterion than did the explicit learners. 
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In a similar experiment, Rabinowitz and Herder (2000) investigated whether 
different transfer functions were associated with implicit and explicit learning. The 
children were trained to criterion on perceptual and conceptual dimensions and then given 
a transfer task using old and new dimensions. They hypothesized "Transfer in implicit 
learners should be associatively based and contextually bound while transfer in explicit 
learners should be conceptually based." Consistent with this hypothesis: (a) explicit 
learners were more likely to choose the middle value on new and old transfer dimensions; 
and (b) implicit learners were more likely to choose the stimulus closest in absolute value 
to the correct training stimulus on the old perceptual dimensions. Since the stimuli on the 
conceptual dimensions were not physically related, no consistent pattern of transfer was 
expected with these dimensions. Contrary to expectation, when the implicit learners were 
presented with pictures of a young woman, a middle-age woman, and an elderly woman 
during learning, and pictures of an infant, toddler, and a young boy during transfer, they 
responded absolutely and chose the young boy. Similarly, if the letters D, E, and F were 
used during training, and the letters P, Q, and R during transfer, they chose P. Among the 
transfer stimuli, the young boy was closest in age to the correct training stimulus, the 
middle-age woman, and the letter P was closest alphabetically to the correct training 
stimulus, E. Thus, the ordering information (i.e., declarative knowledge) the children 
acquired over several years, transferred to a laboratory task in which both learning and 
transfer were probably implicit. 
Artificial grammar. Reber (1969) investigated transfer of implicit knowledge 
using an artificial grammar with university students. Letter strings of varying length that 
adhered to the rules of the artificial grammar were presented to participants one at a time 
for five sec. After presentation of three different letter strings, participants were required 
to write down each of the strings. If the three letter strings were correctly recalled, 
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another three strings were presented. This process continued until a total of 18 strings 
were presented and written correctly. Participants then repeated the learning procedure 
with new letter strings consisting of either: different letters using the same grammar, the 
same letters using a new grammar, new letters using a new grammar, or no changes. 
Reber reported that the errors made in the transfer task increased substantially when the 
grammar changed but not when the letters changed and, therefore, claimed participants 
acquired abstract knowledge about the grammar. 
Altmann et al. (1995) used an artificial grammar with university students in 
Experiment 4 to construct one set of strings instantiated with symbols and another set 
with three-letter nonsense words (referred to as syllables). The two sets of stimuli were 
mapped onto one another, i.e., a circle was mapped to sog, a triangle to rud, a cross-hair 
to kav, such that the syllable sequence sog, rud, kav also appeared as the symbol 
sequence circle, triangle, cross-hair. In the first phase of the experiment, an experimental 
group was asked to memorize sets of symbol strings of varying length that were 
constructed according to the artificial grammar. In a second phase, participants were 
informed about the artificial grammar and asked to determine whether new symbol and 
syllable strings were grammatical or ungrammatical. These new symbol and syllable 
strings contained equal numbers of legal and illegal strings. A control group also 
performed the second phase of the experiment without prior exposure to symbol strings. 
Altmann et al. found the experimental group correctly classified more syllable and 
symbol strings than did the control group. 
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) argued that a participant's ability to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in a typical grammar study, i.e., 
Reber (1969), does not necessarily demonstrate an abstraction of complex rules. They 
contend that performance can be accounted for by learning pairwise associations. In their 
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Experiment 1, university students who learned only legal letter pairs could discriminate 
grammatical and ungrammatical letter strings. Moreover, when the letter strings with an 
illegal starting letter were removed from the test set, participants who only memorized 
letter pairs, performed similarly to participants who learned full letter string exemplars. 
In Experiment 2, additional evidence inconsistent with rule abstraction was obtained. 
During learning, all participants were presented with letter strings to memorize. During 
testing, two types of ungrammatical letter strings were presented which contained either: 
nonpermissible pairs of letters (NP) which were two letters that could not occur together 
as per the artificial grammar, or nonpermissible order pairs (NO) which were permissible 
letter pairs that were in the wrong location in the letter string. For example, if XV was a 
permissible pair in the grammatical letter string RTXVC, then the string RXTVC could 
be considered to contain an example of a NP pair and RTCXV a NO pair. Perruchet and 
Pacteau found better discrimination when a NP, as compared to a NO, pair was included 
in the test string and contend that successful performance in artificial grammar studies 
usually reflects knowledge of legal letter pairs not the abstraction of a complex set of 
rules. 
Tunney and Altmann (1999, Experiment 1), modified the procedure used by 
Altmann et al. (1995, Experiment 4) that was previously discussed, by eliminating 
sequences containing fewer than three elements during training and including test 
sequences containing ungrammatical strings starting with both legal and illegal elements. 
They found university students classified the ungrammatical strings as accurately when 
the test strings were from the same domain as the training domain, regardless of whether 
the first element in the string was legal or illegal. However, participant's ability to 
discriminate ungrammatical sequences composed of test strings from a domain other than 
the training domain was largely accounted for by the rejection of strings containing 
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illegal starting elements. They hypothesized participants learned that starting elements in 
the grammatical sequences only occurred in this initial position and recognized illegal 
starting elements because they occurred elsewhere in the sequence. Tunney and Altmann 
investigated this hypothesis in Experiment 2 by replacing all ungrammatical test strings 
that contained illegal starting elements with ungrammatical strings containing legal 
starting elements. As in Experiment 1, participants could correctly classify 
ungrammatical sequences when the test strings were selected from the training domain, 
but were unable to discriminate ungramatical and grammatical test strings selected from a 
novel domain that contained legal starting elements. They concluded that participants do 
not broadly apply abstract grammar rules across domains in artificial grammar tasks. 
SRT tasks. Willingham et al. (Experiment 3, 1989) examined knowledge transfer 
using the same 1 0-trial repeating sequence presented in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants were first given response training which consisted of teaching participants a 
color-response mapping of four colors to four different response buttons. This was done 
by displaying one of four colored rectangles in the middle of the screen and requesting 
participants to press the correct associated response button. The order in which the colors 
appeared on the screen was quasi-randomly determined and participants were required to 
reach a training criterion 11 ••• of three successive blocks of 100 trials with a mean RT of 
600 ms or less and an accuracy of 90% or better" (p. 1 056). Participants were then 
arbitrarily assigned to one ofthree experimental conditions: perceptual, response, or 
control. In all conditions, participants responded to the color of the stimulus which 
appeared in any one of four horizontal positions. In the perceptual condition, the 
positions in which the stimuli appeared followed the repeating 1 0-trial sequence while the 
colors appeared in a quasi-random sequence in which no color repeated on consecutive 
trials. In the response condition, the positions in which the stimuli appeared was quasi-
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randomly determined so that no stimulus was displayed consecutively in the same 
position while the sequence of colors was ordered so that the correct responses followed 
the repeating 1 0-trial sequence. In a control condition, both the position and color 
sequences were determined quasi-randomly. Subsequently, all participants were 
presented a transfer task in which all stimuli were white and participants were instructed 
to press the button below the location where the stimulus appeared. The order of 
stimulus positions was determined by the repeating 10-trial sequence. Following the 
completion of the transfer task, participants were asked if they noticed whether any of the 
stimuli appeared in a repeating order. If a participant answered yes then he/she was asked 
to indicate the stimulus pattern order. Participants were considered to have acquired 
some explicit knowledge if they could identify at least 4 consecutive stimulus positions in 
the sequence. 
Based on the verbal reports, no participants in the perceptual and control 
conditions acquired any explicit knowledge while 14 out of 61 participants in the 
response group acquired some explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence. Learning 
was examined by comparing RTs of participants in the control, perceptual, the response 
with no explicit knowledge, and the response with explicit knowledge conditions. 
Participants with and without explicit knowledge in the response condition learned. 
However, it appears that knowledge did not transfer across tasks as all groups had similar 
RTs on the transfer task. The authors concluded that learning in the SRT task was neither 
purely perceptual nor motoric, but rather learning consisted of a "series of condition-
action statements mapping stimuli onto responses" (p 1 058). 
Willingham (1999, Experiment 2) used digits "1" through "4" that appeared in the 
middle of the screen and asterisks that appeared in four boxes arranged horizontally on 
the screen. The use of stimuli in the middle of the screen eliminated the possibility of 
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participants learning a sequence of eye movements (Mayr, 1996). During training, 
participants in the spatial condition experienced a sequence of asterisks and those in the 
digit condition experienced a sequence of numbers mapped to the four response keys 
from left to right. On Trial Blocks 2 to 4, the sequence repeated and on Blocks 1 and 5 it 
was random. Participants in the random control condition, experienced randomly 
displayed digits on each trial block during training. During transfer, all participants 
responded to a spatial sequence of asterisks that were random on Trial Blocks 6, 7, and 9, 
but the original repeating sequence appeared on Trial Block 8. Following transfer, a free 
generation task was used to assess awareness in all groups except those in the random 
digits condition. During training, participants in the spatial and sequence digit 
conditions, but not the random condition, decreased RTs across trial blocks and showed a 
large RT increase when the random stimuli were presented on Trial Block 5. In both the 
spatial and sequence digits conditions, but not the random condition, RTs significantly 
decreased on the third block of transfer trials when the repeating sequence was presented. 
This finding was robust even when a stringent criteria was applied to eliminate 
participants from the analysis who may have acquired explicit knowledge. The author 
concluded these results demonstrate implicit knowledge is not transfer specific and 
learning in a SRT task is not solely perceptual nor does it depend on "stimulus-response 
pairings" (p. 566) as previously hypothesized (Willingham et al., 1989). 
In the third experiment (Willingham, 1999), implicit sequence knowledge was 
also found to be flexible. The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2 with 
the following exceptions. During SRT training, only spatial stimuli, i.e., asterisks, were 
used and participants in perceptual and motor conditions experienced an altered 
stimulus-response-button mapping. Participants in the spatial and motor conditions were 
instructed not to press the response button directly under the asterisk but to press the 
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button that was one position to the right. Participants in a SRT condition experienced the 
standard mapping during both training and transfer. During transfer, participants in the 
perceptual and motor conditions experienced the same sequence, either perceptual or 
motor, respectively, as in training and the standard SRT stimulus-response-button 
mapping. Therefore, participants in the motor and SRT conditions experienced the same 
sequence of response locations during both training and transfer. The results reflect only 
participants in the motor and SRT conditions showed significant learning during transfer. 
Willingham concluded that results from these experiments demonstrate the flexibility of 
knowledge acquired through implicit learning in a SRT task. 
In Willingham et al. (2000, Experiment 2), the authors investigated the effect of 
transfer by disrupting motor sequence movements. In the Fingers, Locations, and 
Random conditions, participants responded during training with their hands crossed and 
during transfer with their hands uncrossed. The stimulus sequence and, thus, the response 
locations changed in the Fingers condition during transfer so that the same sequence of 
finger movements was used in training and transfer. Participants in the Locations 
condition experienced the same stimulus sequence during training and transfer and, thus, 
the response locations did not change but a different sequence of finger movements was 
required during transfer. In the random condition, participants experienced a random 
sequence on every block except on the third block during transfer which provided a 
control for learning on transfer. In a fourth condition, referred to as the Both condition, 
participants responded using the standard SRT task in both training and transfer. 
Knowledge acquired by participants in the Locations condition transferred from 
training to the transfer task when participants responded with a different finger sequence 
which is consistent with a number of studies that report SRT learning is effector-
independent (Cohen et al. , 1990; Keele, Jennings, Jones, Caulton, & Cohen, 1995; 
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Japikse, Negash, Howard, & Howard, 2003). In contrast, participants in the Finger 
condition did not appear to learn any more about the sequence during transfer than those 
in the random condition. Therefore, changing the response locations disrupted transfer. 
The authors concluded "that the sequence of response locations must be retained in order 
for implicit sequence knowledge to transfer" (p. 372). 
Based on the literature review, it appears implicitly acquired knowledge by 
children in transposition studies (Rabinowitz & Howe, 1994; Rabinowitz & Herder, 
2000) and by adults in artificial grammar studies is transfer specific (Perruchet & 
Pacteau, 1990; Tunney & Altmann, 1999). However, the specificity oftransfer of 
implicit knowledge acquired by adults in a SR T task is more difficult to characterize. 
Although it is clear that transfer of implicit knowledge is effector independent (Cohen et 
al., 1990; Keele, Jennings, Jones, Caulton, & Cohen, 1995; Japikse, Negash, Howard, & 
Howard, 2003; Willingham et al., 2000), it is not clear when transfer will occur when 
participants experience sequences instantiated with different stimuli associated with the 
same response sequence. In Willingham et al. (1989) participants' knowledge acquired 
with a stimulus sequence of colors failed to transfer to a stimulus sequence of asterisks. 
However, in Willingham (1999, Experiment 2), adults transferred implicit sequence 
knowledge acquired with a sequence of digits to a sequence of asterisks. 
Task Complexity 
When repeating sequences of the same length are presented, sequence structure 
has been found to affect adult participants' SRTs (Stadler, 1992; Stadler & Neely, 1997). 
As sequence structure increases there are fewer unique runs and specific runs occur more 
often. For example, the sequence ABCABCD is more structured and less complex than 
the sequence ABCBDAC. The former contains only three unique 2-trial runs (CA, CD, 
DA), and three runs which repeat twice (AB, BC, ABC), whereas the latter contains 
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seven unique 2-trial runs (CA, AB, BC, CB, BD, DA, AC) and no runs that repeat. 
Stadler (1992) used three sequences to investigate the effects of statistical structure on RT 
performance. University students experienced eight 1 00-trial blocks. The first seven 
blocks consisted of 10 repetitions of a 1 0-trial repeating sequence and the last block 
consisted of quasi-randomly displayed stimuli. Sequence learning was measured by the 
RT decrease across Trial Blocks 1 to 7 and the RT increase across Trial Blocks 7 and 8. 
Verbal awareness was not assessed. Stadler found that the rate of sequence learning 
increased with statistical structure. He suggested that more practice occurred with 
repeating runs of stimuli which likely accounted for the faster RTs associated with the 
more structured, less complex, sequence. 
In a later experiment (Stadler & Neely, 1997), explicit knowledge was assessed 
using a recognition task. Participants were presented with a questionnaire containing four 
different 1 0-trial sequences depicted in columns and were asked to pick the repeating 
sequence experienced in the SRT task. One sequence was previously experienced while 
the other three were quasi-randomly generated. Stadler and Neely replicated their 1992 
findings, but RT performance was not related to how participants answered the 
recognition question. 
Noseworthy (1996) and De Guise and Lassonde (2001) studied the effect oftask 
complexity on children's performance. In a covariation task, Noseworthy found task 
complexity was inversely related to verbal awareness of the covariation rule. In a SRT 
task, De Guise and Lassonde (2001), reported that 6- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 11-year-
olds learned the BABDCACBDC sequence while responding unimanually, but failed to 
learn the DBCACBDCBA sequence when they responded bimanually. The former 
sequence is more structured than the latter because it contains four unique 2-trial runs 
(AB, AC, BA, CA) and three 2-trial (BD, CB, DC) and one 3-trial run (BDC) that repeats 
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twice, while the latter sequence contains eight unique 2-trial runs (AC, AD, BA, BC, BD, 
CA, DB, DC), and only one 2-trial run that repeats twice (CB). Therefore, since the more 
complex sequence structure was associated with bimanual, as compared to unimanual 
responding, and increased sequence structure has been associated with slower SRTs with 
adults (Stadler, 1992; Stadler & Neely, 1997), it is likely that sequence structure 
complexity, not mode of responding, accounted for the failure of 6- to 8-year-olds and 9-
to 11-year-olds to learn the repeating sequence. 
Experimental Objectives 
A number of the issues discussed above were investigated using an SR T task with 
children. First, three tasks were used to assess explicit knowledge: verbal reports, 
recognition, and generation. If measures derived from these tasks reflect a common explicit 
knowledge base acquired during training, intercorrelations between these measures should 
be consistent. In addition, it was suspected that the measures derived from the recognition 
task used by Meulemans et al. (1998) may not be sensitive to some explicit knowledge, i.e., 
obvious part sequences. To increase the sensitivity of this task, the ringer sequences, i.e., 
ABCD, AABB, ABAA, AAAB, were included to determine whether participants explicitly 
notice the absence of simple patterns while they implicitly learn complex patterns. It was 
expected that only the ringers would be correctly differentiated on the recognition test 
because explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence might not be sufficiently robust to 
differentiate old and new complex sequences. 
Second, to examine the effects of age on learning and awareness in a SRT task, third 
and sixth graders were used. Since older children learn explicit tasks faster than younger 
children (Siegler, 1998), if SRT learning is explicit or partially explicit then: (a) the learning 
curves of the older, as compared to the younger, children should be steeper sloped reflecting 
faster acquisition rates; (b) a higher percentage of older, as compared to younger, children 
should report awareness or partial awareness of the sequential structure; and (c) older 
children should make fewer recognition and generation errors than younger children 
(Willingham et al., 1989, 1993). 
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Third, sequence structure was varied to examine the effect of task complexity on 
children's implicit learning and awareness in a SRT task. Sequence structure has been 
reported to affect implicit SRT learning in adults (Stadler, 1992; Stadler & Neely, 1997) and 
is suspected to have affected implicit SRT learning in children (De Guise & Lassonde, 
2001). Using a covariation task, Noseworthy (1996) found that as task complexity 
increased the percentage of children who expressed verbal awareness decreased. To the 
extent that task complexity in a co variation task is related to sequence structure in a SR T 
task, sequence learning and verbal awareness was expected to correlate with sequential 
structure in a SR T task. 
Finally, Berry and Dienes (1993) and Dienes and Berry (1997) claim that one ofthe 
primary characteristics of implicit knowledge is that knowledge acquired in one task does 
not readily transfer to other related tasks (transfer specificity). Results from a number of 
implicit learning studies are consistent with this hypothesis (Meulemans et al., 1998; 
Rabinowitz and Howe, 1994; Rabinowitz and Herder, 2000; Reber 1969; Tunney & 
Atmann, 1999; Perruchet & Amorin, 1992; Willingham et al., 1989). However, knowledge 
acquired by adults in SRT studies appears to be flexible when participants experience the 
same sequence of response locations in similar tasks (Willingham, 1999; Willingham et al, 
2000). In the present experiment, transfer specificity of children' s implicit knowledge was 
examined using spatial and perceptual stimuli which were mapped to the same sequence of 
response locations. Participants were presented with two stimulus types, letters that were 
centrally located and asterisks that appeared in four horizontal locations. 
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Method 
Participants 
The participants were 176 children who attended one of three middle-class schools 
located in predominately, caucasian neighborhoods. The children, their parents, and school 
board officials all consented to having the children participate. There were 44 male and 44 
female third graders (M = 8.6 years, SD = 0.53), and 44 male and 44 female sixth graders 
(M = 11.3 years, SD = 1.37). Due to equipment malfunction, the data files from 13 
additional children were not used. In general, the conditions to which these 13 children 
were assigned are representative of the experimental design. 
Apparatus and stimuli 
An IBM computer with a 21.5 by 16 em screen was used to generate the stimuli and 
record responses. A separate box (22 em wide x 4 em deep x 2 em high) was located in 
front of the monitor. Four square 1.5 X 1.5 em buttons, labeled "A", "B", "C", and "D" 
from left to right, were mounted on the top face of the box, spaced 5 em apart, with 3.5 em 
on each end. In the SRT, recognition, and generation tasks two types of stimuli were used. 
Either an asterisk appeared in one of four horizontal locations or a letter (A, B, C, or D) 
appeared in the middle of the screen. Children responded to the stimuli by pressing one of 
the four buttons on the box which were located below the four possible positions of the 
asterisks. 
Design 
The children were quasi-randomly assigned to one of 24 cells determined by the 
factorial combination of age (third vs. sixth graders), gender, sequential structure (high vs. 
moderate vs. quasi-random), and presentation sequence (asterisks presented before letters 
vs. letters presented before asterisks). A summary of the experimental design appears in 
Table 1. Eight children were assigned to each of the high and moderate structure cells while 
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six children were assigned to each of the low structure cells. More children were assigned 
to the high and moderate structure cells because, as opposed to the quasi-random sequence, 
it was possible to learn these sequences and verbal awareness might correlate with 
performance. Children in the moderate and high structure cells experienced two sets of 
SRT tasks, two sets of verbal awareness questions, two recognition memory tasks, and two 
generation tasks. Only SRT and awareness tasks were presented to the children in the 
quasi-random structure condition because the recognition test sets were inappropriate and 
Willingham et al. (1989) found no difference in generation task performance between 
participants in a quasi-random structure group and those in a repeating sequence group who 
were verbally unaware of the sequence structure. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Procedure 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter entered the child's name, 
an assigned subject number, birth date, grade, gender, and condition into the computer. In 
all tasks, the computer program tracked and coded every stimulus presented, the associated 
response, and response latency. 
SRT tasks. Each of the SRT tasks consisted of320 trials presented in four, 80-trial 
blocks. After the child was seated comfortably in front of the computer, the following 
instructions, similar to those used by Meulemans et al. (1998), appeared on the screen and 
were read to each child who experienced asterisks in the first SRT task. The task and 
instructions were appropriately modified for the children who experienced the letters in the 
first task. In both SRT tasks, a stimulus appeared on the screen that was terminated by a 
correct response. The next stimulus appeared after a 250 ms delay. 
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On the screen in front of you a little star will appear in one of these four places 
(experimenter pointed to the locations of where asterisks would appear). You will 
have to push the button that is underneath the star as soon as the star appears. If you 
make a mistake the computer will make a beep. This is not serious, you simply push 
on the correct button, and then the next star will appear. You must answer as 
quickly as possible, but try not to make mistakes. You will do the task for about two 
minutes and then you will have a little break. Dots will go across the bottom of the 
screen and when they reach the other side, the computer will beep twice. When you 
hear the second beep you can press any button to start again. This will happen three 
times and then you will see the word "STOP" in the middle of the screen. It means 
that we are ready to start the next task. Do you have any questions? Please press one 
of the buttons to begin. 
After the child completed the first SRT task, instructions for the second SRT task appeared. 
This task will now be a little different. Instead of a star appearing on the screen in 
different places, a letter will appear on the middle of the screen. The letter will 
either be an "A", "B", "C", or "D". You will have to press the button with the same 
letter as the one on the screen. You need to do the same thing as you did in the last 
task: answer as quickly as possible, but try not to make mistakes. Do you have any 
questions? Press one of the buttons to begin. 
Verbal awareness tasks. After the child completed the SRT tasks, verbal awareness 
was assessed using the following instructions: 
I am going to ask you a couple of questions about what you just did. I don't want 
you to press any buttons, just tell me what you think. In the first task you pressed 
the button that appeared under a star. For some of the children the stars appeared in 
a regular order and they could learn where the next star would appear. For other 
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children, the stars did not appear in a regular order and they could only guess where 
the next star would appear. Do you think you could tell where the next star would 
appear or did you guess? 
Similarly, in the second task you pressed the button with the same letter that 
appeared on the middle of the screen. For some of the children the letters appeared 
in a regular order and they could learn what the next letter would be. For other 
children, the letters did not appear in a regular order and they could only guess what 
the next letter would be. Do you think you could tell what the next letter would be 
or did you guess? 
The experimenter entered the participants' responses as either 1, 2, 3, orA corresponding to 
the responses, "I knew", "Sometimes knew", I didn't know", or "I was guessing" that were 
displayed on the screen following each question. The latter two categories were offered to 
make the judgements easier for the children. Both were assumed to reflect an absence of 
explicit knowledge. There was no a postori evidence to indicate otherwise, so they were 
combined into a single data entry of "3". 
Recognition tasks. Following the awareness tasks, children who experienced 
repeating sequences in the SRT tasks were presented recognition tasks that were similar to 
tasks used by Meulemans et al. (1998). 
The stars you saw before followed an order that you might have learned. You might 
remember the entire order or parts of the order in which the stars appeared on the 
screen. We are going to do the same thing as before: a star will appear in one of the 
four locations on the screen and you will press the button underneath the star. But 
this time you don't have to worry about pushing the buttons as quickly as you can 
and only four stars will appear on the screen. After you see all four stars and press 
the correct buttons, I am going to ask you whether you remember "Seeing this order 
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of four stars before", "Are not sure whether or not you saw this order before, or 
"You are sure that you did not see this order before". You can see the four star order 
as many times as you like before you make up your mind. Just let me know if you 
want it repeated. When you have your mind made up, tell me what it is. Do you 
have any questions? Are you ready? 
The experimenter pressed a key to start each four-trial sequence. After the child responded 
to each four-trial sequence, the above three answers were displayed on the screen in the 
above order. The children were asked to indicate whether each ofthe four-stimulus 
sequences presented was either: 
1. An order you are sure you saw before; 
2. An order you are not sure whether or not you saw before; 
3. An order you are sure you did not see before. 
Following the child' s choice, the experimenter pressed a number from 1 to 3 corresponding 
to each respective answer. Following the completion of 12 four-stimulus sequences based 
on the asterisks, the child was read modified instructions for letters. 
Generation tasks. After the recognition tasks, children who experienced repeating 
sequences with asterisks first were presented the following instructions: 
As I told you a little while ago, the stars appeared in a way that you might have 
learned where the next star was going to be. For this task, one star is going to appear 
on the screen and instead of pressing the button under the star, I want you to press 
the button where you think the next star will appear. The computer will beep if you 
make a mistake. This is not serious. The next star will not appear until you press 
the correct button. Keep doing this until the word "STOP" appears on the middle of 
the screen. 
Following thirty-nine prediction trials, participants were instructed on the letter stimuli. 
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As I told you before, the letters that you saw earlier appeared in a way that you 
might have learned what the next letter would be. Now we are going to do the same 
thing except you will see one letter on the middle of the screen and I want you to 
press the button with the same letter you think will appear next. Keep doing this 
until the word "STOP" appears in the middle of the screen. 
Sequence structure 
Stimulus response sequences were created with the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 which 
were mapped to the four positions at which an asterisk could appear and the letters A, B, C, 
and D. The sequence 2-4-2-3-1-2-4-1-2-4 was used in the moderate structure condition and 
2-4-2-3-1-2-4-2-3-1 was used in the high structure condition. In the quasi-random structure 
condition, the stimuli appeared randomly with the exception that they did not repeat on 
successive trials. Given a repeating sequence of fixed length, sequences with increasing 
structure contain fewer unique runs and specific runs repeat more often (Stadler, 1992). The 
moderate structure condition contained three unique 2-trial runs (2-3, 3-1, 4-1 ), three runs 
which repeated twice (4-2, 1-2, 1-2-4), and one run which repeated three times (2-4). The 
high structure sequence contained a repetition of the first five stimuli in the moderate 
structure sequence. Thus, there were no unique runs in the 1 0-trial high structure sequence 
and a large number of runs repeated twice. 
Each child, except those assigned to the quasi-random structure group, experienced 
the same repeating 10-trial response sequence with both asterisks and letters in the SRT and 
generation tasks. Four variants of both the moderate and high structure sequences were 
employed. The particular variant a child experienced was randomly determined. The 
variants were generated by using four mappings. The identity mapping resulted in no 
change in the specified sequences (i.e., 1 to 1, 2 to 2, 3 to 3, 4 to 4). Thus, a child in the 
moderate condition who experienced the identity mapping first saw an asterisk in the second 
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position, followed by the fourth position, followed by the second position, etc., in one task; 
and the letter B, followed by the letter D, followed by the letter B, etc., in the other task. 
The remaining mappings were rotations (1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, 4 to 1), (1 to 3, 2 to 4, 3 to 1, 
4 to 2), and (1 to 4, 2 to 1, 3 to 2, 4 to 3). A child in the moderate condition who 
experienced the last mapping described above, first saw an asterisk in the first position, 
followed by the third position, followed by the first position, followed by the second 
position, etc, in one task; and the letter A, followed by the letter C, followed by the letter A, 
followed by the letter B, etc., in the other task. 
Recognition Stimuli 
In each recognition test, 12 four-stimulus sequences were presented: 4 old, 4 new, 
and 4 ringers. The old sequences were experienced in the SRT task; the new sequences 
were similar to the recognition segments used by Meulemans et al. (1998) and; the ringer 
sequences had an obvious structure that was not previously experienced and were included 
to increase the sensitivity of the assessment measure to participants' explicit knowledge. 
The particular stimuli used and the order in which they appeared was randomly determined 
for each child, subject to the constraints described below. In the high structure condition, 
four different old sequences were randomly selected from a five sequence set which 
contained all the 4-trial sequences that can be derived from the high structure sequence. In 
the moderate structure condition, eight of the ten sequences that could be derived from the 
moderate structure sequence were used because two sequences were consider to be ringers, 
i.e., 2-4-2-4 and 4-2-4-2. The ringer sequences contained one double alternation sequence 
(e.g., 1-2-1-2), one double repetition sequence (e.g., 3-3-2-2), one sequence in which the 
same stimulus was presented three times (e.g., 2-4-2-2), and one perfectly ordered sequence 
(e.g., 1-2-3-4 or 4-3-2-1 ). To create new sequences for the high and moderate structure 
conditions, sequences were randomly selected from the high and moderate old sequence 
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sets, respectively, and the last trial was quasi-randomly determined such that the stimulus 
selected was not a repetition of the third element, created a new sequence, and was not a 
nnger. Thus, the old sequence 2-4-2-3 would become 2-4-2-1. 
Results 
Two sets of analyses of variance (ANOVAs), referred to as general and awareness 
analyses, were conducted. In the general analyses, the effects of the independent variables 
on performance on each of the four tasks, SRT, verbal reports, recognition, and generation, 
were examined. In the awareness analyses, the associations of verbal awareness with the 
other dependent variables on each task were assessed and only significant contrast effects 
involving verbal awareness are reported. Since it was not possible for the children to 
correctly report being aware or partially aware of a quasi-random sequence, only the data 
obtained with children in the moderate and high structure groups were used in the awareness 
analyses. Although the scale of measurement for both the awareness and recognition data 
are ordinal rather than interval, the use of parametric statistical tests, as opposed to relying 
solely on nonparametric statistical tests, was considered appropriate (for a review, see 
Zumbo and Zimmerman,1993). Because a large number of dependent variables were 
examined across the two sets of analyses, an attempt was made to moderate the 
expermentwise error rate by setting the significance level at .001 (.01) for within-subject 
(between-subjects) contrast effects. The more restrictive significance level used with 
within-subject, as compared to between-subjects, effects reflects the greater statistical power 
associated with the within-subject tests. The Scheffe (1959) procedure was used in all 
follow-up tests. 
The between-subjects variables in the general analyses were gender, grade (grade 3 
vs. grade 6), sequential structure (quasi-random vs. moderate vs. high; the quasi-random 
condition was not included in the analyses of the recognition, generation, and the awareness 
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data), and stimulus-type sequence (letters-asterisks vs. asterisks-letters). Depending on the 
dependent variable, the within-subject variables were stimulus type (letters vs. asterisks) 
and either trial blocks (Trial Block 1 to 4) or recognition sequence (old vs. new vs. ringers). 
The original plan was to add verbal awareness as an additional between-subjects 
factor to the variables included in the general analyses. Two outcomes necessitated a change 
in strategy. First, separate awareness analyses had to be conducted on asterisk and letter 
data because some participants reported different levels of awareness with each stimulus 
type. Second, level of reported awareness depended on sequential structure. As a 
consequence, when awareness was added as a between-subjects factor some of the cells 
determined by combinations ofthe other between-subjects factors with structure and 
awareness were empty and others had low numbers of participants. In order to increase the 
stability ofthe awareness ANOVAs, only variables that were associated with significant 
contrasts in the general analyses or those of particular interest were included. For example, 
age only was included as a variable in the latency analyses because the older children 
responded faster than the younger children on all the reaction time measures. Age did not 
significantly affect performance with the remaining dependent variables in the general 
analyses. 
Verbal Reports. 
The verbal awareness responses "I knew" (1), "I sometimes knew" (2), and "I didn't 
know or I was guessing"(3), served as the dependent variable in the ANOV A. Only the 
main effect of sequential structure, F(2, 152) = 39.59, was significant. The mean verbal 
awareness ratings for the high, moderate, and quasi-random structure conditions were, 1.42, 
2.13, and 2.38, respectively. The mean verbal awareness rating for the high structure group 
was significantly lower than the average of the mean rating of the quasi-random and 
moderate structure groups, S2(2, 128) = 77.13, while the mean ratings ofthe latter two 
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groups did not differ significantly, .S?(2, 128) = 4.77. These findings reflect that children 
were more likely to report being aware with the least complex sequence. This was expected 
based on the data reported by Noseworthy (1996) using a covariation task. She found 
children were more likely to report awareness of the covariation rule when they were trained 
on a less complex, as compared to a more complex, training task. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
However, the similarity of verbal awareness ratings by children who experienced the 
moderate and quasi-random sequences was unexpected. Therefore, the related frequency 
distributions were examined. The number of children who reported being aware, partially 
aware, and unaware of the sequential structure in each SRT task appear in Table 2. As can 
be seen in the table, reported awareness was not independent of stimulus structure, x2 s( 4) > 
38, n < .001, as children in the high structure group were more likely to report being aware 
of both letter and asterisk sequences than were children in the quasi-random and moderate 
groups. The verbal awareness distributions of children in the two latter groups were similar, 
x2 s(2) < 5, n > .05. Moreover, more than 40% of the children presented quasi-random 
sequences reported being aware or being partially aware of a repeating sequence. Jackson 
and Jackson (1995) reported a similar finding based on unpublished data. They found" that 
subjects trained entirely under random conditions, frequently claimed to have noticed a 
repeating pattern." 
SRT Tasks 
SRT latency 
For each participant, the median RT of correct responses was calculated for each of 
the four 80-trial blocks and these median latency scores served as the dependent variable. 
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General analysis. The older children (M = 0.60 s) responded faster than the younger 
children (M = 0.88 s), F(1,152) = 119.99, consistent with the results reported by Meulemans 
et al. (1998). Of greater interest are the slopes of the RT curves of third and sixth graders 
across trial blocks. As can be seen in Figure 1, the curves were approximately parallel. The 
failure of the age by trial block interaction to reach significance, E(3, 456) = 2.49, 12 > .05, 
is consistent with this observation. If the decrement in RT across trial blocks reflects 
learning, as suggested by Willingham et al. (1989), then both age groups learned at a similar 
rate. Since explicit learning rates in children are age dependent (Seigler, 1998), most of the 
children probably learned implicitly. In general, the SRT data appears to be consistent with 
Reber's ( 1992; 1993) assertion that implicit learning is age invariant. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The mean median-latency scores for the quasi-random, moderate, and high structure 
groups across trial blocks appear in Figure 2. Inspection of the figure reveals that the R Ts 
of participants in the high structure group decreased, while the RTs of participants in the 
moderate and quasi-random groups remained relatively stable resulting in a significant 
Structure by TB interaction, E(6, 456) = 19.63. Thus, the main effect oftrial blocks, E(3, 
456) = 29.09, primarily reflects the performance of children in the high structure group. 
The RTs across trial blocks for each of the structure groups did not overlap. Therefore, the 
main effect of structure, E(2, 152) = 25.43, is interpretable. As expected, learning rates 
increased with increased sequential structure (Stadler , 1992, 1997) but the difference 
between the mean RTs in the quasi-random and moderate structure groups was not 
significant, .S? (2, 152) = 6.52, while the difference between the mean RT score of the high 
structure group and the average of the means of the quasi-random and moderate groups, S2 
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(2, 152) = 48.22, was significant. Because the third and sixth graders did not learn the 
complex sequences, it is likely that sequence complexity accounts for De Guise and 
Lassonde's (2001) failure to find learning in 6- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 11-year-olds when 
they responded bimanually, as opposed to unimanually. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
As can be seen in Table 3, participants in the quasi-random group who experienced 
letters second responded slower with the letter stimuli than did participants who experienced 
letters first. In every other comparison, participants who experienced a particular stimulus 
set second, as compared to first, responded faster to that set. The consistency of the order 
effect across the remaining five combinations was reflected in the Stimulus sequence X 
Stimulus type interaction, .E(1,152) = 30.03. It appears that these data reflect nonspecific 
transfer, perhaps a warm up effect, and not transfer of sequence knowledge across stimulus 
types because the order effect was not restricted to children who learned in the high 
structure condition. It is not clear why the aberation occurred with letters in the quasi-
random group, but it was associated with a triple interaction of stimulus type, stimulus 
sequence, and structure, .E(2,152) = 8.80. Not surprisingly, further inspection of Table 3 
reveals that participants responded faster to asterisks than letters, .E(1,152) = 110.51, as it 
required less time to press the response button directly below an asterisk stimulus than to 
find and press the correctly labelled button when a letter stimulus appeared in the middle of 
the screen. Willingham (1999) reported a similar effect using centrally presented digits. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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Awareness analyses. Reported awareness was correlated with response latency with 
letters (aware, partial, and unaware; Ms = 0.69, 0.80, and 0.87 s, respectively), E(2, 115) = 
5.05). The mean latencies of the partial and unaware groups did not significantly differ, 
.S?(2, 116) = 1.46, but the mean latency of the aware group was significantly faster than the 
average ofthe mean latencies of both the partial and unaware groups, S?(2, 116) = 16.56. 
No significant differences in latency were found between the awareness groups when the 
participants experienced asterisks, E(2, 116) = 1. 99, p > . 0 5. However, the pattern 
represented by the mean latency of the aware, partial, and unaware groups with the asterisk 
data (Ms = 0.61, 0.67, and 0.69 s, respectively) was similar to the pattern with the letter 
data. The association of awareness with RTs is consistent with other reported findings 
(Willingham et al., 1989; Curran and Keele, 1993; Mayr, 1996). The more robust 
relationship obtained with the letters may reflect that the letter sequences were easier to 
verbally code. 
SRT errors 
General analysis. As can be seen in Table 4, accuracy of responding was high 
throughout the SRT task as the average number of errors per 80-trial block was less than 4. 
The number of errors across trial blocks monotonically increased with asterisks while they 
were relatively stable with letters, E(3, 456) = 6.19. It is likely that more anticipatory errors 
were associated with the faster RTs with the asterisks stimuli and this probably caused the 
observed interaction. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Awareness analyses. No significant contrasts involving verbal awareness were 
obtained. 
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Recognition Tasks 
Recognition judgments 
Children's recognition judgments ui am sure I saw this order before", ui am not sure 
whether or not I saw this order before", and "I am sure that I did not see this order before" 
were scored 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and served as the dependent variable for participants 
in the high and moderate structure conditions. 
General analysis. Participants clearly differentiated the old, new, and ringer 
sequences (Ms = 1.78, 2.20, 2.73, respectively), £(2,224) = 114.32). All pairwise follow-up 
comparisons were significant, .S?s(2, 224) > 42.78. It is not clear why participants were 
more likely to judge letter sequences, than asterisks sequences, as new (Ms = 2.32 and 2.15, 
respectively), E.(1,112) = 23.45). It should be noted that structure did not affect recognition 
performance, replicating the findings reported by Stadler and Neely (1997). 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Awareness analyses. Although the main effects of recognition sequence, Es(2, 244) 
> 43.50, and awareness, Es(2, 122) > 7.82, were significant, the recognition sequence by 
awareness interactions approached significance in both analyses (letters: E.s(4, 244) = 4.08, 
n = 0.003; asterisks: Es(4, 244) = 3.28, n = 0.012) and warranted further investigation. The 
relevant data appear in Table 5. The simple effect of the recognition sequence was 
significant with both stimulus types at each level of awareness, Es(2, 224) > 21.49, with the 
exception that the effect only approached significance in the unaware condition with the 
letter data, £(2,224) = 6.26, n < 0 .005. The verbally aware participants discriminated the 
old and new sequences, .S.2s(2, 224) > 20.81, while the partially aware and unaware failed to 
recognize these sequences as different, .S.2s(2, 224) < 6.46, n. > .05. All participants 
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discriminated the old and ringer sequences; the pairwise differences were significant in all 
comparisons, S2s(2, 224) > 33.13, except in the unaware condition with the letter data which 
approached significance, £2(2, 224) = 11.85, 12 < 0.005. The children's sensitivity to the 
ringer sequences was highlighted by the fact that the children were more likely to judge the 
ringers, compared to the new sequences, as not having been experienced before in the SR T 
task even though both types of sequences were not previously experienced. This difference 
approached significance with the aware conditions and the unaware conditions with letters, 
S2s(2, 224) > 11.17, 12 < 0.005, but was significant in the remaining conditions, S2s(2, 224) 
> 28.88. 
It was expected that children would only differentiate the ringer part sequences as 
Meulemans et al. (1998) reported children and adults failed to differentiate old and new part 
sequences in their SRT study. However, the sequence used in the Meulemans et al. study 
was more complex than either ofthe repeating sequences used here and Meu1emans et al. 
did not assess verbal awareness which was found to influence recognition performance in 
the current experiement. 
Recognition judgement latencies 
The mean judgement latencies (average median latency between the last response to 
the four trial part sequence and the rating) served as the dependent variable and was a 
measure of sequence recognition speed. 
General analysis. Participants' mean judgement latencies on the ringer, old, and 
new sequences were 2.24, 2.93, 2.96 sec, respectively, E(2, 224) = 31.83. The faster RTs 
associated with the ringer sequences likely reflects that they were quickly identified as not 
having been experienced before. The difference in mean judgement latencies between the 
old and new sequences was not significant, S\2, 224) = 0.09, but the mean judgement 
latency with the ringers was significantly faster than the average of the judgement latencies 
with the old and new sequences, .S? (2, 224) = 63.57. 
Awareness analyses. No significant contrast effects involving awareness were 
obtained 
Recognition judgement matching errors 
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A matching error occurred when a participant pressed the wrong button in response 
to the displayed stimulus. The number of matching errors made with each sequence was 
used as a measure of transfer from the SR T task to the 4-trial recognition context. 
General analysis. The number of matching errors made by participants depended on 
the type of sequence they experienced (Ms = 0.28, 0.45, and 0.55 for the old, new, and 
ringer sequences, respectively), thus, reflecting transfer, E(2, 224) = 10.99. The mean 
number of matching errors with the new and ringer sequences did not significantly differ, .S? 
(2, 224) = 3.22, n < 0.05, but the mean number of errors collapsed across these groups was 
significantly greater than the mean errors obtained with the old sequences, .S?(2, 128) = 
18.78. 
Awareness analyses. No significant awareness contrast effects were obtained. 
Generation Tasks 
Performance on the first 1 0 trials of the generation task was a fairly direct measure 
of transfer of sequential information from the SR T task. Consequently, in both the general 
and awareness analyses, the dependent variable of primary interest was the number of errors 
participants made on the first 1 0-trial block. Of lesser interest was the number of errors 
participants made on the remaining three 1 0-trial blocks because both the feedback which 
followed each generation response and potential transfer of information acquired in the SRT 
task could influence performance. The latter measure was included to facilitate 
comparisons with data reported in other studies (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Willingham et 
al. , 1989). 
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Generation errors 
General analysis. The effect of structure on generation task performance has not 
been studied before and was found to affect performance in the current experiment. 
Participants in the high structure group made fewer errors than those in the moderate 
structure group on both dependent variables, Es(l, 112) > 16.91, reflecting transfer from the 
SRT task to the generation task. The relevant mean errors for trial block 1 (mean errors 
collapsed across all trial blocks) were 5.07 and 7.90 (3.54 and 7.45), respectively. 
Consistent with findings reported by Nissen and Bullemer (1987) and Willingham et al., 
(1989), performance improved with practice (trial blocks 1 to 4 Ms = 6.48, 5.44, 5.22, 4.93, 
respectively), £(3,336) = 15.07. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Awareness analyses. As shown in Table 6, increasing verbal awareness was 
associated with fewer errors on the generation task. The awareness main effect was 
significant with both dependent variables for the letter stimuli and with the collapsed across 
trial blocks dependent variable for the asterisks stimuli, E.s(2, 122) > 7 .12. The aware 
groups made significantly fewer errors than the partial and unaware groups on both 
dependent variables with letters, .S?(2, 122) > 16.66, and this difference approached 
significance with the asterisks data collapsed across trial blocks, .S?(2, 128) = 13.30, 12 < 0 
.002. Differences in errors made by the partial and unaware groups were not significant, 
S2(2, 122) < 2.70, 12 > .05. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Awareness measures 
Correlations between explicit measures 
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If the measures derived from the three tasks used to assess awareness reflect a 
common explicit knowledge base acquired in training, then the measures should be 
correlated. The correlations between verbal awareness ratings; the difference between new 
and old, ringer and old, and ringer and new recognition part sequences; and generation 
errors on the first trial block were computed to assess the consistency of the explicit 
measures and are shown in Table 7. Explicit knowledge is reflected by: low verbal 
awareness scores; large difference scores between new-old recognition ratings and ringer-
old recognition ratings; minimal difference scores between ringer-new recognition ratings; 
and few generation errors on the first trial block. With the exception that participants who 
best discriminated ringer and old part sequences were more likely to erroneously 
discriminate ringer and new part sequences with both stimulus types, all the significant 
correlations are consistent with the assumption that there is a common explicit knowledge 
base reflected in each of the explicit measures. Inspection of the table reveals that the 
correlations between the recognition measures are particularly robust but the remaining 
correlations reflect considerable variability across measures. However, since verbal 
awareness is consistently related to all the measures there is no apparent reason not to use it 
as an individual difference index. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Perfect performance as a function of structure and awareness 
There are a number of criteria that could be used to categorize participants as 
explicit learners in a SR T task. A priori, perfect performance on either the generation or 
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recognition task would seem to be particularly robust measures of explicit learning (e.g., 
Willingham et al. , 1989, full explicit knowledge). The relationships between verbal 
awareness judgments, perfect performance on recognition tests, and perfect generation 
performance on the first block of trials are considered here. As can be seen in Table 8, if 
perfect performance on the 12 recognition test sequences was used as the criteria for explicit 
learning, 13 of 69 aware, 2 of 29 partially aware, and 2 of 30 unaware participants would 
have been judged as explicit learners with the letter sequences, while 14 of 62 aware, 2 of 
23 partially aware, and 3 of 43 unaware participants would have been judged as explicit 
learners with the asterisk sequences. Only eight of these participants performed perfectly 
with both letter and asterisk sequences. If perfect recall of the sequence as reflected in 
motor responses on the first block of the generation task was used as the criteria for explicit 
learning, 13 (9) aware, 1 (0) partially aware, and 1 (0) unaware would have been classified 
as explicit learners with the letter (asterisk) sequences. Only three of these participants 
performed perfectly with both letter and asterisk sequences. If perfect performance on both 
the recognition and generation task with letters (asterisks) was used as the criteria for 
explicit learning, six (four) participants would have been classified as explicit learners. 
Only one participant performed perfectly on all tasks. Obviously, the perfect performance 
measures are too restrictive to provide an adequate way to characterize participants as 
explicit learners. On the other hand, an inspection of the table highlights the 
interdependency of the verbal awareness ratings with both perfect performance measures. 
In addition, only verbally aware participants performed perfectly on both the recognition 
and generation tasks with either letters or asterisks. As is the case with the correlation data, 
these relationships reflect that performance on all three transfer measures is based, at least in 
part, on the explicit knowledge acquired during SRT learning. 
Discussion 
Assessing Explicit Knowledge 
Verbal Reports as an Assessment of Implicit/Explicit Learning 
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It has been argued that verbal reports are insensitive measures of explicit knowledge 
(Perruchet & Amorin, 1992; Shanks & St. John, 1994) that may not tap low confidence 
knowledge (Berry & Dienes, 1993). Although this insensitivity may characterize the reports 
of some participants in SRT tasks, it appears that false positive reports were more likely 
than false negatives in the present experiment. Many children in the quasi-random group 
reported experiencing a structured sequence when such a sequence did not exist. 
Furthermore, the distribution of verbally aware, partially aware, and unaware responses 
were similar for children in the quasi-random and the moderate-structure groups. However, 
the verbal reports of children in both the moderate and high structure groups correlated with 
other performance measures such as SRT latency, recognition accuracy, and generation 
errors. It would appear that the children in the high and moderate structure groups based 
their verbal awareness reports on the accessibility of a representation of the repeating 
sequence. It is unlikely that children in these two groups would base their verbal reports on 
a representation of information acquired in the experimental session while children in the 
quasi-random group would just spuriously produce verbal awareness judgements. If this is 
the case, what information did the children in the quasi-random group use when they 
reported awareness or partial awareness? 
A possible explanation for why some of the children in the quasi-random group 
reported awareness. The 1 0-trial repeating sequences were designed so that obvious 4-trial 
sequences did not appear. The quasi-random sequences were constructed so that stimuli did 
not repeat on successive trials so that if a particular stimulus appeared on Trial N, all other 
stimuli were equally likely to occur on Trial N + 1. These constraints generated 4-trial 
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alternating sequences (i.e., XYXY, where X andY represent any 2 stimuli) with a 
probability of 1/9 and simple series (i.e., either ABCD, BCDA, CDAB, DABC, DCBA, 
CBAD, BADC, or ADCB) with a probability of 2/27. Since these two types of simple 
patterns occurred on 18.5% ofthe 4-trial part sequences and were likely to be incidentally 
monitored and explicitly learned by the children in the quasi-random group, some of these 
children reported they could predict the stimuli in the SR T task. 
Recognition Memory Measures as Assessments of Implicit/Explicit Learning 
Meulemans et al. (1988) reported children and adults learned a repeating 1 0-trial 
sequence, but failed to recognize the difference between old and new 4-trial part sequences 
in a recognition task. Based on this finding, they claimed participants did not acquire any 
explicit knowledge in the SRT task. However, it was probably difficult to discriminate the 
new and old part-sequences because they only differed on the last trial. Thus, Meulemans et 
al. may have used an insensitive measure of participants' explicit knowledge. In order to 
increase the sensitivity of the recognition test, obvious ringer type sequences were added in 
the present experiment. If the children incidentally monitored the stimulus sequence for 
simple patterns such as perfectly ordered series (e.g., ABCD), double alternations (e.g., 
ABAB), double repetitions (e.g., CCAA), and one stimulus appearing three times (e.g., 
AABA), then the presence or the absence of such sequences should be recognized explicitly. 
Since the recognition task is considered an explicit task, children would be expected to 
access explicit representations more quickly and accurately than implicit representations. 
Consistent with these conjectures, children in the structured groups recognized the ringer, as 
compared to the old and new, sequences more quickly and accurately; and unaware and 
partially aware participants failed to discriminate the old and new sequences. However, the 
aware participants did discriminate the old and new sequences perhaps because the 
sequences used in the present experiment were less complex than those used by Meulemans 
et al. (1998). It would appear that if a range of sequences that are easy to discriminate are 
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included in recognition tests, then the recognition task can be used to derive useful indices 
of implicit and explicit learning. 
Intercorrelations between explicit measures 
The correlations between the measures based on verbal awareness ratings, 
recognition judgements, and generation errors on the first trial block, for the most part, were 
consistent with the assumption that the explicit measures assess a common knowledge base 
acquired in SRT tasks. The frequency distributions based on awareness ratings, perfect 
performance on the recognition task, and perfect performance on the first block of the 
generation task reflect interdependencies that are also consistent with the idea of a common 
knowledge base. Although it has been argued that verbal reports are insensitive measures of 
explicit knowledge (Perruchet & Amorin, 1992; Shanks & St. John, 1994) that may not tap 
low confidence knowledge (Berry & Dienes, 1993), results from the current experiment and 
those reported by Jackson and Jackson (1995) are inconsistent with these arguments as both 
children and adults who experienced quasi-random sequences reported they knew or 
sometimes knew where the next stimulus would appear. Thus, over-sensitivity, rather than 
undersensitivity might best characterize using verbal awareness ratings to index explicit 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the consistent association of verbal awareness ratings with all the 
measures derived from the recognition and generation tasks for children who experienced 
structured sequences support the continued use of these ratings as an index of individual 
differences. 
Age effects 
Reber (1992, 1993) argued that the cognitive hardware required for implicit 
processing predates the evolutionary development of the structures required for conscious 
awareness and, therefore, implicit learning should be age invariant, as compared to explicit 
learning which is age dependent (Siegler, 1998). Consistent with Reber's hypothesis: (a) 
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the SR T curves of older and younger children were approximately parallel; (b) awareness 
ratings did not differ as a function of age; and (c) there was no significant difference in the 
number of errors on the recognition or generation task as a function of age. Based on these 
results and those reported by others (Meulemans et al. 1998; Thomas and Nelson, 2001), it 
appears that acquired implicit SRT knowledge is age invariant across middle childhood, 6 to 
11 years. However, the failure of the children to learn the more complex structure in the 
present experiment and in the De Guise and Lassonde (200 1) experiment, when contrasted 
with successful learning of comparable structures by older children (e.g., De Guise & 
Lassonde) and adults (e.g., Stadler, 1992), relegates Reber's age invariance hypothesis to a 
relative short period of development. 
Sequence Structure Effects 
The verbal report and SRT latency data were consistent with the predictions that 
increasing structure would correlate with verbal awareness and learning rate. One possible 
explanation to account for this effect is that the children incidentally monitored and 
explicitly learned bigrams/dyads (e.g., AB, CA) in the repeating sequences. A repeating 5-
trial sequence was used in the high structure condition while a repeating 1 0-trial sequence 
was used in the moderate structure condition. The defining 5-trials in the high structure 
sequence were identical to the first 5 trials of the moderate structure sequence. Therefore, 
not only did the children in the high structure, as compared to the moderate structure, group 
experience fewer unique dyads/bigrams, these dyads/bigrmas occurred at twice the 
frequency. Ifthe children in the high structure group were more likely to detect and 
explicitly learn 2-trial sequences, then they should have quickly and accurately anticipated 
successive stimuli in both the SR T and generation task which, in turn, would have been 
reflected in decreasing SR T latencies across training and fewer generation errors. 
Consistent with these conjectures, participants in the high, as compared to the moderate, 
structure group learned at a faster rate in the SR T task and transferred that knowledge to the 
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generation task. Surprisingly, structure did not affect performance of participants on the 
recognition task replicating the findings of Stadler and Neely (1997). It may be that only 
complete knowledge of the bigrams contained in each of the 4-trial part sequences is 
sufficient to facilitate recognition accuracy. 
Transfer 
Transfer of implicit knowledge across perceptual stimuli using the same response sequence 
A number of investigators have found that implicitly acquired knowledge does not 
readily transfer across tasks or stimulus dimensions (Rabinowitz & Herder, 2000; 
Rabinowitz & Howe, 1994; Willingham et al., 1989). Such transfer specificity is 
considered to be a primary characteristic of implicit knowledge (Berry & Dienes, 1993; 
Shanks & Johnstone). However, Willingham (1999) found that when the same response 
location sequence was maintained, implicit sequence knowledge acquired by adults in a 
SRT task transferred across perceptual stimuli when the standard stimulus-response 
mapping was used, and also transferred across perceptual stimuli when the perceptual 
stimulus-response mapping was altered one space to the right of the location of the first 
response button. Willingham, concluded implicit sequence knowledge can be flexible. 
Transfer of implicit knowledge was investigated in the present experiment by 
presenting participants a sequence of letters (asterisks) and then a sequence of asterisks 
(letters) while maintaining the same response location sequence. If acquired knowledge of 
the repeating sequence transferred across stimulus sequences, then SRTs on the second, as 
compared to the first, stimulus sequence should have been significantly faster. The only 
evidence that might be construed as knowledge transfer across perceptual stimuli appears in 
Table 3. Inspection of that table reveals that participants who experienced a particular 
perceptual stimulus set second responded faster with that set than did the participants who 
experienced the set first. This order effect was characteristic of children in the high and 
moderate structure groups with both letters and asterisks, and children in the quasi-random 
51 
group with asterisks. Since only the children in the high structure condition improved in 
performance acrosstrial blocks, the criterion Willingham et al. (1989) used as an index of 
SR T learning, and the order effect characterized the performance of the children in all 
groups with one exception, it most likely reflects nonspecific transfer rather than transfer of 
specific sequential information. No other significant contrast effects, across any dependent 
variables in both the general and awareness analyses, involved both stimulus-type sequence 
and stimulus type. Thus, it is unlikely that learning transferred from letters to asterisks or 
v1ce-versa. 
Two explanations are offered as to why implicit transfer across stimulus sequences 
did not occur in the present experiment but did occur in two experiments reported by 
Willingham (1999). One possibility is that transfer of implicit knowledge may be age 
dependent. Consistent with this hypothesis, Reber (1967) found less implicit transfer with 
high school, as compared to university, students using an artifical grammar. Another, more 
speculative hypothesis, is that prior declarative knowledge may mediate transfer of 
implicitly acquired knowledge. Rabinowitz and Herder (2000) offered such a hypothesis to 
explain why verbally unaware children chose the nearest absolute stimulus on old 
conceptual dimensions, i.e., pictures of people representing an age dimension and sets of 
letters representing the alphabet, during transfer despite the fact that there was no clear 
physical relationship between these stimuli. It is possible Willingham (1999) obtained 
transfer from numbers to asterisks, in Experiment 2, because people have extensive 
experience counting stimuli that appear in a linear array and, therefore, automatically 
associated numbers with the positions at which the asterisks appeared. Similarly, extensive 
experience reading from left to right might have mediated the transfer when participants in 
Experiment 3 experienced a perceptual sequence of asterisks displaced one space to the left 
of the standard stimulus-response mapping and then experienced the same perceptual 
sequence properly aligned with the standard stimulus-response mapping. In contrast, 
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children may not have had enough experience using letters to label stimuli in a linear array 
for declarative knowledge of associations between letters and positions to mediate transfer 
in a speeded implicit task. 
Both implicit and explicit knowledge transfers across tasks 
Although implicit knowledge did not transfer across stimulus dimensions in the 
present experiment it did transfer from the SRT task to the recognition task as children in 
the structured groups responded faster to the old part sequences than to the new and ringer 
part sequences. Explicit transfer occurred across tasks as structure was associated with 
transfer from the SRT to the generation task and awareness ratings were associated with 
both recognition judgments and generation errors. Thus, the implicit and explicit 
knowledge acquired in parallel during SRT learning (also see Curran and Keele, 1993; 
Noseworthy, 1996; Seger, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Willingham, 2001; Willingham & Goedert-
Eschmann, 1999; Willingham, Salidis, & Gabrieli, 2002) were associated with different 
aspects of transfer performance. 
Summary 
1. Measures of explicit learning appear to be related to a common explicit 
knowledge base. Verbal awareness ratings were consistently associated with measures of 
explicit learning derived from the recognition and generation tasks and appear to be a useful 
index of explicit knowledge. 
2. When children experience a quasi-random sequence, it appears that they 
incidently monitor and explicitly learn simple patterns. To the extent that their behaviour is 
characteristic of all participants, when children report they can predict the stimuli in the 
repeating sequence, their judgments are based on explicit knowledge of simple patterns 
rather than explicit knowledge of the entire sequence. 
3. Children apparently incidently monitor and explicitly learn simple sequences 
while complex sequences are learned implicitly. Thus, both implicit and explicit learning 
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occur in a SRT task, possibly in parallel. 
4. Age only affected the speed of responding in the present experiment and other 
SRT studies in which comparably aged children were the participants. Thus, age invariance 
of implicit SR T learning characterizes middle childhood. Because older children and adults 
implicitly learn complex sequences in the SRT task while 6- to 11- year olds do not, Reber's 
( 1992, 1993) age in variance of implicit learning hypothesis is inconsistent with SRT 
performance. 
5. Children who experienced the same response location sequence but different 
perceptual sequences did not transfer acquired sequence knowledge across the different 
stimulus type sequences. It appears implicit learning by young school age children can be 
transfer specific when the same response sequence is experienced. 
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Table 1 
Summary of experimental design. 
SRT Task Verbal Recognition Generation 
Awareness Task Task 
Task 
Children Children 
A-L 
responded questioned 
Quasi 
3, 6 M,F to a quasi o n ability 
Random 
L-A random to predict 
sequence. stimul i . 
Children Children 
A-L Chi ldren asked t o wer e 
responded Childre n rate their presented 
to a questioned recognition the first 
Moderate 3 , 6 M,F moderate on ability of old, stimulus i n 
structure t o predict new , and the seque nce 
L-A sequence. stimuli . ringer 4- and asked to 
trial part predict the 
sequences next 3 9 . 
Children Children 
Children Children asked to were 
A- L 
responded q ues t i o ned rate their present ed 
to a high on ability recognition the f i rst 
High 3 , 6 M,F structure to predict of old, stimulus in 
sequence . stimul i. new, and the sequence 
L-A ringer 4 - and asked to 
trial part predict the 
sequences next 3 9 . 
* A-L means particl pants experlencec asterl s ks tlrst t h en l etters 
L-A means participants experienced letters first t h en asterisks 
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Table 2 
Number of children reporting they were aware , partially aware , or unaware of the 
sequential structure. 
Structure 
Quasi - random 
Moderate 
High 
Aware 
10 
1 9 
50 
Letters 
Partial Unaware 
16 
21 
8 
22 
24 
6 
Asterisks 
Aware Partial Unaware 
6 
19 
43 
12 
15 
8 
30 
30 
13 
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Table 3 
Mean (SOl serial reaction time in seconds for each sequential structure group as 
a function o f stimulus- type sequence and the order in which each stimulus 
sequence was experienced . 
Stimulus Type 
Letters 
Asterisks 
Structure 
Quasi- random 
Moderate 
High 
Means (SD) 
Quasi-random 
Moderate 
High 
Means (SD) 
First 
0.90 ( 0 . 20) 
0. 85 (0.19) 
0.74(0.29) 
0.82(0 . 24) 
First 
0 . 80(0 .17 ) 
0 . 72( 0.24 ) 
0 . 65 (0.22) 
0.72(0.22) 
Order 
Second 
0.95 (0.20 ) 
0.79(0.23) 
0.59(0.32) 
0 .7 6(0.30) 
Second 
0.74(0. 19 ) 
0.67 (0. 22) 
0.55(0.25) 
0 . 65(0 . 2 4) 
Means (SO) 
0.93(0.20) 
0 . 82(0 . 2 1) 
0 . 66(0 . 31) 
0.79(0.27) 
Means (SD) 
0.77(0 .18 ) 
0.70(0.23) 
0.60(0.24) 
0 . 68(0 . 23) 
Table 4 
Number of SRT errors across t r ial blocks as a f u nct i on of stimulus type. 
Stimulus type 
Asterisks 
Letters 
Means 
1 
2.53 
2 . 72 
2.62 
Trial Bl ock 
2 
3 . 08 
2 . 90 
2 . 99 
3 
3 . 32 
2 . 80 
3 . 06 
4 
3 . 52 
2.68 
3 .10 
64 
Means 
3 . 11 
2 . 77 
2 . 94 
65 
Table 5 
Mean judgement ratings of aware, Qartially aware, and unaware children with old, 
new , and ringer sequences . 
Stimulus type 
Letters 
Asterisks 
Sequence 
Old 
New 
Ringer 
Means 
Old 
New 
Ringers 
Means 
1 old vs . new, Q < .001 
2 old vs . ringe r, Q < .001 
new v s. ringer , Q < . 001 
Aware 
2.051 • 2 
2.52 
2.86 
2 . 48 
Aware 
1.74 1 ' 2 
2.40 
2.78 
2 . 31 
Awareness 
Partial 
1. 592 
1. 94 3 
2.88 
2 . 14 
Partial 
1. 23 2 
1. 7 1 3 
2. 64 
1. 86 
Unaware 
1. 69 
1. 84 
2.22 
1. 92 
Unaware 
1. 7 62 
1 . 78 3 
2.55 
2 . 03 
Means 
1. 78 
2.10 
2 . 65 
2.18 
Means 
1. 58 
1. 96 
2.66 
2 . 02 
Table 6 
Number of generation errors of aware. 9artially aware , and unaware chi ldren 
averaged across each 10-trial block. 
Stimulus type 
Le tters 
Asterisks 
Awareness 
Aware 
Partial 
Unaware 
Means 
Aware 
Partial 
Unaware 
Means 
1 
4 . 16 
6.26 
8.35 
6 . 26 
1 
6.21 
7.69 
8 . 63 
7 .51 
Trial Blocks 
2 
3 . 89 
6.83 
7.81 
6 . 18 
2 
4 . 11 
6.55 
6 . 95 
5.8 7 
3 
3.02 
6.09 
8.54 
5 . 88 
3 
4 . 32 
5.06 
7.58 
5.66 
4 
2 . 70 
5 . 69 
7.13 
5.17 
4 
4 . 00 
5 . 4 8 
7.46 
5.65 
Means 
3.44 
6.22 
7.96 
5.87 
Means 
4 . 66 
6.20 
7.66 
6.17 
66 
67 
Table 7 
The correlation between explicit measures . 
Letters 
verb awa new-old r i ng-old ring-new gen err TB1 
verb awa 1. 00 
new-old -0.11 1. 00 
ring-old 0.06 0 . 60** 1. 00 
ring-new 0.18* -0.43** 0.47** 1. 00 
gen err TB1 0.45* -0 . 25* * - 0.09 0.18* 1. 00 
Asterisks 
verb awa 1. 00 
new- old -0.31** 1. 00 
ring-old -0.07 0 . 53** 1. 00 
ring-new 0.25** -0.48** 0.49** 1. 00 
gen err TB1 0 . 30** - 0 . 16 - 0 .02 0 . 15 1. 00 
Note *p< . 05, **p< .01 
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Table 8 
The frequency of participants who were errorless on the recognition task or on 
the first trial block of the generation t ask. 
Task Stimulus Type 
Recognition Letters 
Asterisks 
Generation Letters 
Asterisks 
Structure 
Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
High 
Aware 
2 
11" 
Aware 
Aware 
Aware 
Awareness 
Partial 
2 
0 
Partial 
2 
0 
Partial 
0 
1 
Partial 
0 
0 
Unaware 
2 
0 
Unaware 
3 
0 
Unaware 
0 
1 
Unaware 
0 
0 
•six parti cipants performed perfect ly on t h e recognition and generation tasks 
with l etters 
hFour participants performed perfectly on t he recognition and generation tasks 
with asteriks 
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Fi gure 1. The SRT task average medi an RT on e a c h tria l block as a f unct i o n of 
age . 
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